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I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports
are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with
an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject
the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which
are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the ﬁrst claim of the received view, that
dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate in more detail the
second assumption of the received view, that dream reports are generally accurate. I then
propose a “narrative fabrication” view of dreams as an alternative to the received view.
Dream reports are often confabulated or fabricated because of poormemory, bizarre dream
content, and cognitive deﬁcits. It iswell documented that narratives can be altered between
initial rapid eye movement sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. I argue that we have
reason to suspect that initial reports are prone to inaccuracy. Experiments demonstrate
that subjects rationalize strange elements in narratives, leaving out supernatural or bizarre
components when reporting waking memories of stories. Inaccuracies in dream reports
are exacerbated by rapid memory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is
a process of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking memory, we
cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream experiences involve imaginative elements,
and dream content cannot be veriﬁed with external evidence. Some dreams may involve
wake-like higher cognitive functions, such as lucid dreams. Such dreams are more likely
to elicit accurate reports than cognitively deﬁcient dreams. However, dream reports
are generally less accurate than waking reports. I then propose methods which could
verify the narrative fabrication view, and argue that although the theory cannot be tested
with current methods, new techniques and technologies may be able to do so in the
future.
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INTRODUCTION
The “received view” of dreams is that dreams are conscious expe-
riences we have during sleep which are sometimes reported upon
waking. This can be separated into two claims: (1) dreams are
experiences that occur during sleep and (2) dreams are reported
upon waking. This view is not only widely accepted in the lit-
erature1, but it is also the common sense view of anyone who
has remembered a dream. Challenges to this view rarely surface,
althoughhere I evaluate andhighlight someof itsweaknesses. Nor-
man Malcolm and Daniel Dennett propose anti-experience views,
they deny the ﬁrst claim of the received view. Although I high-
light evidence which demonstrates that conscious experience does
occur during sleep, Malcolm and Dennett raise important issues
that are not explained by the received view. I show that a rejection
of the second claim of the received view provides a more plausible
explanation of the issues raised by Malcolm and Dennett. I pro-
pose that dream reports are not always reports of experiences we
have during sleep, but rather are often fabricated or confabulated
1Flanagan (2001); Foulkes (1999); Hobson (2002); Jouvet (1999); Metzinger (2009)
and Revonsuo (1995) to name a few, support the received view.
narratives created by the waking mind. I refer to this as the narra-
tive fabrication thesis. This type of fabrication is itself an interesting
phenomenon worthy of detailed analysis. Although it may be pos-
sible for some dreams to be accurately reported, given our current
technology and methods it is very difﬁcult to discern whether any
particular dream report is an accurate representation of the dream
content, and there is no fail-safe method to ensure accuracy. I
will propose future methods that could be used to test the extent
to which narrative fabrication occurs. I begin with an overview
Malcolm’s and Dennett’s views, highlighting their various
strengths and weaknesses.
CHALLENGES TO THE RECEIVED VIEW
Malcolm (1956, 1957, 1959) argues that dreams are logically
dependent onwaking reports. According toMalcolm,“the concept
of dreaming is derived, not from dreaming, but from descriptions
of dreams”(Malcolm,1959, p. 55).We cannot verifywhether expe-
riences occur during sleep, all that we know is that dream reports
are made upon waking.
Malcolm’s argument heavily relies on his criteria for being
“sound asleep.” For sleep to fall under “the normal criteria [...]
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in the ordinary sense” (Malcolm, 1959, p. 30), a sleeping individ-
ualmust be prone,unaware of their surroundings and unresponsive
to stimuli; if someone responds to the question “are you asleep?,”
any response would prove that they are awake. People who sleep
talk and sleep walk therefore are not genuinely sound asleep.
They involve“qualiﬁed assertions” (p. 29) about non-stereotypical
sleeping states. To assert that something occurred in a dream is
to assert that it did not really happen2. Asserting “I am sound
sleep” is contradictory. Malcolm infers that I cannot judge that I
am asleep, since to be able to judge what state I am in, I must
ﬁrst be given an ostensive deﬁnition and learn how to appropri-
ately apply the phrase “I am in this state.” This cannot be done
whilst asleep. Malcolm is a strong supporter of Wittgenstein’s view
that the concepts expressed by language must not be derived from
purely subjective experience. “If language is to be a means of com-
munication there must be agreement not only in deﬁnitions but
also [. . .] in judgments” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 242). It is the
intersubjective practice of discourse during waking life that gives
intelligibility to language, and such discourse cannot occur during
sleep.
Judging “I was dreaming” relies on a waking inference about
a previous state. We cannot guarantee that a dreamer’s judgment
“I had a dream” refers to a sleeping experience as there was no
behavior at the time to verify the claim. This distinguishes the
dream report from a waking state report such as “I was in pain”
since there may have been pain behavior during the waking pain
state. Since we are unable to judge when we are asleep, and unable
to judge when another is dreaming, Malcolm concludes that sleep
experiences are unveriﬁable. We derive our concept of dream-
ing not from experiences that occur during sleep, but from the
reports we make upon waking. However, if experience does not
occur during sleep,Malcolm’s view does not explainwhywe report
dreams.
Dennett (1976) regards Malcolm’s veriﬁcationist approach
as “too drastic” (p. 159), although he also ﬁnds the received
view to be problematic. Rather than simply attempting to
undermine the authority of the received view, Dennett goes
a step further than Malcolm by proposing potential rivals.
One such rival is the cassette view, that dreams are memories
that are inserted into consciousness like cassettes upon waking
up.
Dennett discusses a type of dream that provides evidence
against the received view which I call the suspense dream. In
such a dream, suspense builds up to an event that coincides with
some sensory stimulus from the external world3. In an anecdo-
tal example, the dreamer is in a saloon and is challenged to a
duel. The dreamer is shot, and the sound of the gun coincides
with a car backﬁring in the external world. Dennett himself has
2Sosa (2005) similarly argues that anything that occurs within a dream occurs under
an “in the dream” operator, which entails that the event, including thoughts, beliefs
and other mental events did not in fact occur.
3Dennett refers to these as “precognitive” dreams. However “precognitive” dreams
also refer to a broader subset of dreams which appear to predict events but do not
involve the same suspense aspect, or ﬁltering in of external stimuli. E.g., I dream that
my town gets hit by a cyclone, and two days later, it does. Since Dennett denies that
these dreams could truly be precognitive, I ﬁnd “suspense dream” to be a preferable
term.
experienced such dreams, and they have been reported in the
scientiﬁc literature. In one experiment, water was dripped on a
subject’s back during rapid eye movements (REM) sleep. Upon
waking the subject reported dreaming of singing in an opera,
then seeing the soprano being struck by falling water. When he
ran to her and bent down, he felt dripping water on his back
(Dennett, 1976, p. 158). It is likely that in these examples, the
stimulus has ﬁltered into the dream, causing the dreamer to hear a
bang or feel dripping water. The unusual build-up towards this
event, and then the seamless incorporation of the sound into
the narrative, as if scripted, suggests the dream is precognitive,
that it predicts the car backﬁring or water dripping. A dreamer
hearing a bang and turning around to see that a gun went off is
not problematic for the received view since there is no element
of suspense. Dennett argues that if the received view is correct,
we must attribute some type of prescience to the dreamer. Since
precognition is dreams is highly improbable, the received view is
implausible.
Dennett admits that most reports of suspense dreams are
anecdotal, and although there are some noted in the literature,
they are not commonly documented. If they occur statistically
rarely, the suspense element could be due to coincidence, or
perhaps dream narratives are sufﬁciently ﬂexible to seamlessly
incorporate a variety of external stimuli. Both explanations are
consistent with the received view, but Dennett rejects them. He
notes that together the anecdotal examples and examples from
experiments are sufﬁciently common to rule out coincidence, and
the cases in the literature do not support the ﬂexible narrative
explanation.
Dennett focuses on an alternative to the received view called
the cassette view: memories, like cassettes, are inserted into con-
sciousness upon awakening. These memories are stored in our
minds like a library of undreamed dreams and have various
endings that can be replayed in response to relevant external
stimuli. When we wake up, we simply replay these “cassettes”
as if remembering an experience that had just occurred whilst
asleep. Generation of the cassettes could occur during REM sleep,
which would explain the increased brain activation. Dennett notes
that cassette generation is difﬁcult to explain, yet there has been
no widely accepted explanation of dream generation according
to the received view either. This is still true today. Under this
view lucid dreaming is not awareness of dreaming, but rather a
sense when we wake up that the generation of the cassette had
an element of conscious intention. Dream “memories” are false
memories.
Many theorists ﬁnd this skepticism about dreaming implau-
sible4, as it contradicts current empirical evidence. I agree that
it is implausible to deny that conscious experience occurs dur-
ing sleep. I instead propose a more plausible challenge to the
received view that is both consistent with the current empiri-
cal data and that solves the problems raised by Malcolm and
Dennett.
4This view has in fact been rejected by most dream theorists. I will not review
all of the arguments here, but note what I see as the weakest points of Malcolm’s
argument, namely incorrect assumptions about being sound asleep. See also Ayer
(1960); Brown (1957) and Dunlop (1977).
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SLEEP AS DEFINED BY NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND LUCID
DREAMING CONFIRM THAT EXPERIENCE OCCURS
DURING SLEEP
Revonsuo (1995) contends that Malcolm’s argument fails due to
its reliance on faulty assumptions about sleep. Stages of sleep are
deﬁned by neuropsychology: different stages of sleep are classiﬁed
according to brain activity rather than behavior or lack thereof.
Although REM sleep typically causes paralysis to the body, abnor-
malities such as REM sleep behavior disorder (RBD) can occur
(Windt and Metzinger, 2007, p. 5) in which the dreamer appears
to act out their dreams. Experiments have correlateddreamreports
with RBD behavior (Schenck et al., 1987). Scientists consider
abnormal cases such as RBD to be under the criterion of REM
sleep. Contrary to Malcolm’s view, an individual may be asleep
despite sitting up in bed and acting as if they are hallucinating.
Since his deﬁnition of being sound asleep plays such an impor-
tant role in Malcolm’s argument, the possibility that an individual
could act out their dream provides strong evidence against his
view. However, since Dennett’s view does not rely on Malcolm’s
deﬁnition of being “sound asleep,” his view is not weakened by
this evidence. Appearing to act out a dream may not mean that a
subject is consciously aware of dreaming, but might be an uncon-
scious response to the “cassette production” that occurs during
REM sleep.
Eye signaling experiments on lucid dreamers provide sufﬁcient
evidence to disprove the anti-experience thesis. Lucid dreamers
can learn to signal that they are dreaming by performing a series
of learned eye movements (LaBerge, 1981). I can see no other
plausible explanation for this ability than that experience occurs
during sleep, and that the dreamer is aware they are dreaming. One
could argue that the eye movements are an automatic response
after they had been learned and rehearsed sufﬁciently. However,
this seems implausible since they correlate only with lucid dream
reports and an automatic response could occur during any session
of sleep. Although lucid dream signaling cannot verify non-lucid
dream experience, lucid dreams provide strong evidence that con-
scious experience does occur during sleep. Dennett’s explanation
of lucid dreams is implausible. If lucidity is merely a sense of
agency over cassette generation, it is unclear how an individual
could gain sufﬁcient self-awareness whilst asleep to carry out pre-
learned eye movements. If I learn to ﬂick my eyes a certain way
when I realize I am dreaming, although this may not be liter-
ally asserting “I am dreaming,” this is a communication of “I am
dreaming” which is sufﬁcient to verify a dream is occurring. So
Malcolm’s argument that I could never learn to appropriately
assert “I am dreaming” is a red herring, since I can certainly
learn to communicate “I am dreaming” whilst dreaming using eye
ﬂicks.
I conclude that Malcolm’s deﬁnition of being sound asleep is
highly implausible given current data on sleep stages. A sleep-
ing individual may, for example, exhibit pain behavior and still be
“sound asleep.”The strongest evidence that experience occurs dur-
ing sleep is lucid dreaming experiments that involve a participant
signaling that they have gained lucidity. This cannot be plausibly
explained by either Malcolm’s or Dennett’s views. Nonetheless, as
I show now, the received view of dreams is ﬂawed, and an alterna-
tive explanation for certain problematic phenomena is required.
I provide an explanation which is more plausible than Malcolm’s
and Dennett’s views.
ROOM FOR SKEPTICISM: WHAT THE RECEIVED VIEW DOES
NOT EXPLAIN
The received view of dreaming as of yet does not explain some of
the empirical data and issues raised by Malcolm’s and Dennett’s
views. In this section Iwill discuss why there is room to be skeptical
of the received view even if we reject Malcolm’s and Dennett’s anti-
experience arguments and accept that experiences do occur during
sleep.
Firstly, the received view does not explain why eye movements
and other sleep behaviors are difﬁcult to correlate with non-lucid
dream reports. The discovery of REM sleep led Dement and
Kleitman (1957a,b) to propose a scanning hypothesis of dreams:
that REMs scan dream imagery. Early experiments attempted to
demonstrate that dream reports are highly correlated with eye
movements, for example, dreams about throwing a basketball into
a hoop correlate with vertical eye movements. However, these
experiments were based on small sample sizes and the results have
not been replicated in subsequent experiments. Doricchi et al.
(2006) claim that “despite decades of research, the question of
whether the REMs of paradoxical sleep (PS) are equivalent to
waking saccades and whether their direction is congruent with
visual spatial events in the dream scene is still very controver-
sial”. According to Hobson et al. (2000), “further evidence would
be required to conﬁrm [the scanning] hypothesis”. The strongest
correlations made to date are from lucid dream experiments5.
Lucid dreamers can carry out speciﬁc, prearranged tasks dur-
ing a lucid dream and signal whilst they are performing these
tasks using eye-ﬂicks and muscle twitches (Schatzman et al., 1988)
which correlate with dream reports. However, lucid dreaming
is not indicative of all sleep phenomena and it is difﬁcult to
verify non-lucid dream content. Although lucid dreaming in
particular provides strong evidence that experience does occur
during sleep, if the received view were correct, we would expect
either that correlations between reports and eye-movements could
either be made in both lucid and non-lucid dreams, or in
neither6. However, as I argue my view has a plausible expla-
nation as to why such correlations are so tenuous in non-lucid
dreams.
Foulkes (1999, p. 10) notes that other sleep behavior such as
sleep walking rarely corresponds to dream reports and “there is a
somewhat better, but still imperfect, relation between sleep speech
and dream speech.” Arkin et al. (1966, 1970a,b), argue that they
demonstrate signiﬁcant overlap between dream reports and sleep
talk that occurred during REM sleep, however, this is not clearly
the case. Arkin et al. (1966) examined the dream reports and sleep
talk of a habitual sleep talker (S) to ﬁnd correlations between the
two. They found that higher rates of sleep talk could be invoked
by hypnotizing S before he fell asleep. They used post-hypnotic
5Extensive research has been done on lucid dreaming. See Kahan and LaBerge
(1994); LaBerge (2000); LaBerge and DeGracia (2000); LaBerge and Levitan (2004);
Spadafora and Hunt (1990). For discussion, see Windt and Metzinger (2007).
6The received view does not imply the scanning hypothesis, but there would
need to be an explanation why scanning only correlates with reports for some
dreams.
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suggestion (PHS) “tonight you will sleep normally and naturally
and talk in your sleep in the same manner as you do at home,
but more abundantly” (p. 295). Electro-oculogram (EOG) and
Electroencephalogram (EEG)7 were used to compare eye move-
ments and brain activity to verify during which sleep stages the
talking occurred. The content of the sleep talking sessions, accord-
ing to Arkin and colleagues, correlated strongly with the content
of the dream reports collected upon waking. For example, sleep
talk:
Now viewing a ﬁlm of past experiences in gallery for small
admission charge (Arkin et al., 1966, p. 305) correlated with the
dream report:
Uh-[pause]-there’s a theatre that you pay admission charge and they run
ﬁlms of your life-that’s all I remember except that I was in one of those
theatres a minute ago (Arkin et al., 1966, p. 305).
Arkin and colleagues also found that most aspects of hypno-
tized sleep replicate non-hypnotized sleep, with similar electrical
brain activity and similar but somewhat gentler eye movements.
This might provide evidence that non-hypnotized sleep speech is
also associated with dream content, but there are some concerns
regarding these studies. Firstly, correlations between reports and
sleep talk in this study were often vague. Unclear, mumbled words
are often assumed to be words that correlate with the report, but
this is not always justiﬁed8. As I discuss in Section “Confabulation
and Memory Loss,” some reports suggest the opposite, that dream
reports are not a good indication of dream content. Secondly, it is
not clear whether hypnotism affects the content of dreams or the
accuracy of the report. Waking memory reports involving hypno-
tism are subject to increased confabulation. Ofshe (1992) found
that hypnotism can cause a subject to be susceptible to suggestion,
or even cause false memories. Therefore dream memories after
hypnotism may also be false. The received view does not explain
why reliable correlations between sleep talk and dream reports are
so elusive.
Finally an important point raised by Malcolm is that we should
realize the limitations of neuroimaging in providing information
about cognitive states. Neuroimaging provides information about
activity in the brain whilst asleep and data about the activation of
speciﬁc brain regions can then be correlated with reports. Hobson
et al. (2000) and other theorists use neuroimaging data to corre-
late dream reports with neural activation under the assumption
that neuroimages can help verify the content of dream reports.
Schwartz and Maquet (2002) note that “the speciﬁc regional dis-
tribution of brain activity during REM sleep might [...] be linked
to speciﬁc dream features” (Schwartz and Maquet, 2002, p. 23).
Malcolm (1959) rejects this possibility, arguing that we cannot
infer experience from brain activation. We could not infer that a
certain pattern of activation that correlates with conscious experi-
encewhilst awakewould correlatewith the same experience during
sleep. Brain activation without a subjective report is not sufﬁcient
to verify a conscious state is occurring. This view has recently
gained supported from cognitive neuroscientists.
7Electrooculogram (EOG) measures sleeping eye movements, and Electroen-
cephalogram (EEG) measures electrical brain activity.
8To be discussed in more detail in the Section “Room for Skepticism: What the
Received View Does Not Explain.”
Klein (2010a,b) notes that making inferences from images of
brain function to psychological function can be problematic for
many reasons. One problem is that the brain is a densely connected
system and any cognitive task should cause increased activation
all over the brain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
imaging uses a threshold to distinguish between relevant and irrel-
evant activation, however, the choice of threshold is an arbitrary
decision made by the experimenter, and this choice can have the-
oretically important implications for the research (Klein, 2010a).
Secondly, inferences made about the psychological function of
a type of brain activation are already biased towards the pre-
conceived notions of the experimenter9. A more extreme view
proposed by Harley (2004) and Coltheart (2006), is that neu-
roimaging data are irrelevant to psychology because we do not yet
have sufﬁciently precise theories about how psychology relates to
particular neural phenomena. Theories about the relation between
particular brain activity and psychology are required before neu-
roimaging can tell us anything about psychology, i.e., by giving
predictions about psychological events. Yet once each theory is
formulated and conﬁrmed, “[neuroimaging] would have noth-
ing of interest to contribute to psychology” (Klein, 2010b, p.
169) since all of the important information would already be
known10.
With current technology, it is impossible to discern the speciﬁcs
of dream content, such as characters, and events. For example,
there is no way to discern that a dream is about playing with
puppies from brain activation. Although neural activation corre-
lated with reports gives some evidence that consciousness occurs
during sleep, distinguishing between consciousness and uncon-
sciousness using neuroimaging data alone can be difﬁcult. Monti
(2010) notes that misdiagnoses of the conscious state of vegetative
patients occurs in around 40% of cases. In sleeping subjects, this is
complicatedby the“input blockade”(Hobson,2002),whichmeans
that in most cases, subjects are unresponsive to external stimuli.
Verifying whether a subject is conscious or aware of internally gen-
erated dream stimuli is still primarily dependent on dream reports.
Levy’s (2006) discussion of research on unconscious patients who
exhibit complex unconscious cognitive processing demonstrates
that complex cognitive processing can occur when a subject is
unconscious. In one experiment, unconscious patients in a per-
sisting vegetative state exhibited brain behavior suggesting that
they can distinguish between sentences with congruent and incon-
gruent endings, a complex task that theorists previously thought
could not be completed unconsciously. This is why I believe that
lucid dream signaling, rather than neuroimaging, provides the
strongest evidence that consciousness occurs during sleep. The
upshot of this is that neuroimaging, using current technology and
methods, cannot conﬁrm the second claim of the received view,
that dream are accurately reported upon waking.
9Examples of this are discussed by Fine (2011), in which assumptions about the dif-
ferences between male and female cognition lead researchers to search for evidence
of small differences in brain activity. Whether such activity indicates differences in
cognition is unknown.
10In Section “Verifying Fabrication” I argue that this is the key to verifying dream
content, so such a theory does not mean neuroimages no longer have anything
interesting to contribute. Once all of the relevant data is known, then we will be able
to use imaging techniques to discern speciﬁc content of dreams.
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The received view fails to provide a convincing explanation
of suspense dreams, the failure of research groups to either con-
ﬁrm or deny the scanning hypothesis and ﬁnally, why correlations
between sleep talk and sleep reports are so tenuous. Furthermore,
the second claim of the received view, that dream reports are
accurate, is not veriﬁed by evidence from neuroimaging. I now
propose a view that provides a plausible explanation for these
ﬁndings.
NARRATIVE FABRICATION IN DREAM REPORTS
Since the received view of dreams does not explain why correla-
tions between eye movements and dream reports are so tenuous,
why sleep behavior and sleep talk are so rarely correlated with
dream reports, or suspense dreams, I propose a view that takes
these failings into account. Although I have argued that it is
implausible to deny the ﬁrst claim the received view, that expe-
rience occurs during sleep, the second claim, that dream reports
accurately represent dream content, is a more plausible target. A
further analysis of the accuracy of dream reports is justiﬁed. If
we reject this second claim, we can overcome the inconsistencies
of the received view whilst being consistent with current scien-
tiﬁc data. I propose a “narrative fabrication” thesis of dreams.
According to this view, dream reports are often confabulated so
that the narrative reported is not accurate of the dream expe-
rience itself. The main reasons this occurs, which I discuss in
Sections “Rationalization of Strange Content” and “Confabula-
tion and Memory Loss,” are that dreams can be bizarre which
leads to rationalization of their content, and memory of dreams
is poor, which can cause confabulation of dream events. Cer-
tain reporting conditions such as attaining lucidity can help to
minimize confabulation, which explains why dream reports can
at times correlate with dream behavior. However, the frequency
of confabulation or fabrication cannot be entirely known using
current methods. I begin by explaining how the narrative fab-
rication thesis can solve some of the problems of the received
view.
A BETTER EXPLANATION FOR SUSPENSE DREAMS AND
INCONSISTENT CORRELATIONS
Firstly, the narrative fabrication thesis provides a more convincing
explanation as to why eye scanning does not consistently cor-
relate with non-lucid dreams reports, but is more consistently
correlated with lucid dreams. If dream reports were largely fab-
ricated by the waking mind and we rely on the accuracy of the
dream report to make correlations, then it would be very dif-
ﬁcult to consistently correlate dreams with behavior. We have
reason to suspect that non-lucid dream reports are more prone
to narrative fabrication than lucid reports. This, as I discuss in
more detail in the following section, is because cognitive abilities
such as memory and rational capacity are better retained in lucid
dreams (Kahan and LaBerge, 1994; LaBerge, 2000; LaBerge and
DeGracia, 2000). This would explain why research of lucid dreams
has consistently been able to correlate eye movements and mus-
cle twitches (Schatzman et al., 1988), because lucid dream reports
are generally more accurate than non-lucid reports. Under the
received view of dreams, this difference between lucid and non-
lucid dream correlations is not convincingly explained. Narrative
fabrication also would explain why sleep talk and other sleep
behaviors have such tenuous connection with dream reports.
The dream reports are often fabricated by the waking mind, and
when the reports are fabricated, they do not correlate with sleep
behaviors.
Secondly, the narrative fabrication thesis provides a plausible
explanation for suspense dreams. The suspense element of sus-
pense dreams is best explained by fabrication or confabulation of
the dream report after waking. If dream reports are highly fab-
ricated or confabulated, the “suspense” element might be part of
the confabulation. Rather than “predicting” the external stimulus,
elements such as the suspense, the feeling of “building up” to an
event and even the apparent “seamlessness” in which the stimu-
lus is incorporated into the narrative are confabulated elements
of the report narrative that do not accurately describe the orig-
inal dream experience. For example, in Dennett’s opera singer
example, the chronology of the events in the report may not
be accurate of the actual dream, and the suspense and narra-
tive structure may be added in the report. Perhaps there was no
water involved in the dream until the dreamer bent over, and the
water falling on the soprano prior to that was a confabulation. The
saloon scene in the other dream example might not have preceded
the shooting in the way the report claims. Rather, the shooting
may not have ﬁt into the narrative seamlessly at all, but instead
the waking mind confabulates such elements so that the narra-
tive is more logical or more like a ﬁlm narrative where events are
foreshadowed.
Confabulation of the report narrative after waking is far more
plausible than the cassette view. In the following, I discuss reasons
that confabulation or fabrication can occur. Firstly, I compare con-
fabulation in dream reporting with waking confabulations and set
out how the two differ. Then I argue that bizarre and unusual expe-
riences are prone to confabulation and rationalization. In other
words, we have a tendency to make unusual or bizarre stories more
coherent. Subsequently I discuss ways in which poor memory of
dream content can lead to confabulation.
DREAM NARRATIVE FABRICATION vs. WAKING CONFABULATIONS
People confabulate when they report sincerely and with convic-
tion false beliefs about the past or the present or false explanations
about their current attitudes and behaviors. Confabulation can
occur in the presence of dementia, amnesia, or delusions for
instance, but is also common in normal cognition (Bortolotti et al.,
2012, p. 102).
In this section I draw on the literature of waking confabu-
lations to compare with fabrication of dream reports. I note that
dream reporting shares common elements with confabulation, but
can involve other non-confabulatory elements which add to the
inaccuracy of dream reports. Hence I use the more broad term
“fabrication” as opposed to “confabulation.”
Early work on confabulation by Bonhoeffer (1901) and later
conﬁrmed by Berlyne (1972) distinguished two situations when
confabulation occurred in patients with Korsakov syndrome, a
disorder in which patients with severe memory loss confabulate
past events. Bonhoeffer notes that patients often confabulate due
to embarrassment caused by memory blanks, and other situa-
tions in which a patient goes beyond the needs of hiding the
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impairment, creating fantastic or adventurous scenarios. He notes
a link between these stories and a delirious, dream-like state. Con-
fabulations in waking patients are often linked to dream like states
such as daydreams (Scheid, 1934; Whitty and Lewin, 1961). I later
discuss why such states are often linked with report fabrication,
because of their bizarreness and poor memory retention. Berlyne
(1972, p. 38) deﬁnes confabulation as “a falsiﬁcation of memory
occurring in clear consciousness in association with an organically
derived amnesia.”This deﬁnition excludes falsiﬁcation of memory
due to delirious states. Dreams have been described by some as a
form of delirium (Hobson, 1988; Hobson et al., 2000). If dream
narrative fabrication were related to delirious aspects of dreams,
then Berlyne’s (1972) description would exclude dream report
fabrication. When I discuss confabulation in regards to inaccu-
racy of dream reports, I do not mean to exclude the possibility
that dreams can be delirious, so a more appropriate deﬁnition is
that of Metcalf et al. (2010, p. 65) who state that confabulations
are “statements or actions that involve distortions or misin-
terpretations of memories without the conscious intention to
deceive.”
Bortolotti et al. (2012) note that confabulations are usually
formed when sufﬁcient evidential support for a belief is absent,
and are resistant to evidence that disproves the belief. Similarly,
in a set of experiments on mild to sever confabulators, Shapiro
et al. (1981) found that confabulators have difﬁculty monitor-
ing the accuracy of their performance, and have difﬁculty using
cues to aid performance. In dream reporting, there is no external
evidence that can provide cues or support for or against a partic-
ular dream report, other than inconsistency between earlier and
later reports of the same dream. Shapiro and colleagues refer to
cognitive deﬁcits in confabulators, whereas the dream reporter,
who is most likely cognitively unimpaired, is reporting a pre-
vious state in which they may have been cognitively impaired.
Unlike in most cases of confabulation, the dream reporter is
not typically in a delusional state (when reporting)11. However,
since some dreams may themselves involve delusional elements12,
these elements may increase the dreamer’s propensity to con-
fabulate upon waking. This might lead to difﬁculty reporting
accurately.
I use the term“fabrication” instead of “confabulation” as ﬁrstly,
I do not believe that all of the inaccuracies in dream reports
can be conﬁrmed to be sincere false beliefs, and secondly, peo-
ple who report their dreams are not necessarily convinced that
their own report is accurate. Regarding the former, some people
may be motivated to distort or leave out embarrassing elements
11If we were to accept Dennett’s cassette theory, that dream reports do not describe
sleeping experiences, we could consider the reporter to be in a delusional state since
theywould be reporting something that hadnot happened at all (thanks to a reviewer
of this article for this interesting point). However I reject the anti-experience the-
sis, so I do not think that the dreamer is delusional when they are reporting the
dream.
12Hobson et al. (2000, p. 799) argues that“dreams are delusional; we are consistently
duped into believing that we are awake unless we cultivate lucidity”. Although I do
not agree that dreams are entirely delusional, I think we have good reason to concede
that dreams can involve many delusional elements. For example, one might identify
a character in a dreamas theirmother even though it looks nothing like theirmother.
A mundane dream about one’s mother in which she looks as she normally does, on
the other hand, would not be delusional.
of dreams. This differs from Bonhoeffer (1901) discovery that
confabulation can be cause by embarrassment, because for con-
fabulators the embarrassment is caused by having poor memory.
In contrast, the dreamer knowingly distorts the report due to
embarrassing content in their memory. Regarding whether dream
reporters are convinced by their reports, I think dreamers are
often unsure and admit to having poor memory. In a dream
report from Arkin et al.’s (1966, p. 205) research that I discuss
in more detail in Section “Confabulation and Memory Loss,”
the dreamer reports “Uh-uhm-uh-gee I- something about- yeah-
a hat[. . .]” which indicates that the dreamer admits his mem-
ory of the dream is poor, but is trying to work out the details
of the memory. So I refer to narrative “fabrication” instead of
“confabulation” so as not to exclude other elements that can
cause inaccuracy, although confabulation is certainly one of these
elements.
I conclude that some of the explanations and mechanisms of
confabulation in delusional patients may be relevant to dream
reporting. Conversely it is clear that dream reporting is not entirely
analogous with waking confabulation, and there are other ele-
ments involved in narrative fabrication. Commonalities include
memory recall deﬁcits, the possibility of reporting fantastical
events, lack of ability to reality check and lack of evidential sup-
port for beliefs. Differences include the fact that dream reports
can be fantastical but plausible, i.e., the dream itself can be fan-
tastical, whereas reports of waking events cannot. While dreaming
we undergo cognitive deﬁcits, but not during the reporting of the
dream, whereas the delusional confabulator suffers from deﬁcits
while making the report. This explains the waking confabula-
tor’s inability to fact check and inability to support their view
with plausible evidence. In contrast, the dreamer lacks the abil-
ity to fact check and gain evidential support not because of a
cognitive deﬁcit but rather because dreams are not externally veri-
ﬁable andwe cannot provide evidence to support their plausibility.
Additionally, dreams can be fantastical, so it is not possible to
test for plausibility. Dream reports can involve confabulation,
but they are in important ways different from the confabu-
lated reports of waking events made by cognitively impaired
patients. What remains is to provide evidence for the fabrication
of dream reports and discuss to what extent are dream reports
fabricated.
RATIONALIZATION OF STRANGE CONTENT
In this section I argue that dream narratives often are confabulated
upon waking because of the nonsensical content of dream expe-
riences. I assume Montangero’s (2012, p. 170) broad deﬁnition of
“narrative” as “any report of a sequence of events involving per-
sons or animals who react to one another or to physical events.” I
agree with Montangero’s assessment that dream reports are gen-
erally more comparable to informal waking reports rather than
stories, although dream reports may involve elements of story-
telling, when a person reporting their dream is motivated to alter
the narrative, for example, due to embarrassing content. These
elements, however, could be controlled for by making reports
anonymous. Instead I focus on the fabricated elements that are
more akin to waking confabulations, as set out in the previous
section. Montangero argues that “dreaming cannot be considered
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as the production of disorganized mental content since dreams
have narrative features” (p. 169). In contrast, I argue that many of
these narrative features may be a production of the waking mind
rather than the dreaming mind. The waking mind often recon-
structs the experience into a more coherent narrative, and this
may happen as we try to remember and report the dream. I discuss
studies which show that waking reports are also rationalized over
time and argue that, given current technology, we cannot know
to what extent a dream has been rationalized even if the dreamer
is woken directly from REM sleep. There are no failsafe condi-
tions to guarantee that a dream report will be accurate, although
certain conditions will increase the probability of an accurate
report.
Owen Flanagan considers the possibility that dreams are “sim-
ply noise left over from the work a mind designed for a day job
continues to make on the night shift” (Flanagan, 2001, p. 40).
This noise is interpreted into narratives by the conscious sleeping
mind. Foulkes (1982,1985) similarly describes dreams as the sleep-
ing conscious mind’s attempt to organize unconscious activation
of memory units. In this view, the dreaming mind does a good job
of composing realistic narratives, which explains why lab-based
reports are only occasionally unrealistic and contain bizarre fea-
tures13. My view in contrast is that although experience occurs
during sleep, the narrative of the dream is altered or fabricated by
the waking mind.
The narrative of a dream may be composed partially or entirely
upon waking14, but there is evidence supporting that dreams
themselves have some narrative structure. If dreams were only
disordered phenomenal sensations without narrative, all dream
reports should be similar to what Hobson (2002) refers to as
“internal percepts,” simple, unimodal sensations that lack nar-
rative. The sensation of falling that many experience when falling
asleep is an example of this. However, even bizarre dream reports
are distinct internal percept reports in that they have some nar-
rative structure, involving characters and events occurring over
time. Some evidence indicates that dreams are convincing sim-
ulations of waking life and waking concerns (Snyder et al., 1968;
Snyder, 1970, p. 127; Domhoff, 2007). I argue that it is likely
that bizarre dream content is often rationalized by the waking
mind.
Foulkes (1979, 1999) observed that several forms of selectivity
occur in dream reporting when the dreamer has time to confab-
ulate. Foulkes (1979) compared REM and non-REM (NREM) lab
awakenings with natural morning awakenings in the same sub-
ject, and found that in the morning reports, there is a tendency
to rationalize dreams, as subjects assume that they would make
rational decisions and that outcomes would be rational. Foulkes
notes that there can be, during dreaming, a remarkable dissocia-
tion, by waking standards, of feeling and action. One commits
13Foulkes (1996, 1999) and others argue that dreams are generally not as bizarre
as we may believe, but rather home reports tend to be biased towards memorable,
strange dream experiences. During lab awakenings, dreams reports often reﬂect
normal, waking life.
14This differs from Malcolm, who does not clarify when the composition of dream
reports occur, and from Dennett, who suggests that the narrative is unconsciously
composed by the mind during REM and we become conscious of the experience
upon waking.
atrocities, with no remorse. One stands naked, with no guilt
or shame. What may happen in [morning] recall is that wak-
ing rationalization supervenes and imposes feelings on events
wherein none were in fact experienced: “Because I did this, or
because this happened to me, I must have felt this” (Foulkes, 1979,
p. 246).
In one REM awakening, a subject initially reported a dream
of being chased but feeling no fear during the dream. In the
later morning report of the same dream they described being
afraid (Foulkes, 1999, p. 26). Foulkes suggests that the wak-
ing mind of the subject rationalized that the dream should have
been scary, so misremembered it thus. Dreams lack appropri-
ate binding of multiple sensory modalities (Revonsuo, 1995), i.e.,
the subconscious process of joining together multiple aspects
into a single, coherent experience. The waking mind may ratio-
nalize these mismatching modalities to form a more coherent
narrative.
Evidence for the rationalization of ordinary waking memory
content is demonstrated by Bartlett’s (1932) work, in which sub-
jects were asked to remember a story called “The War of the
Ghosts.” The story involved supernatural elements such as ghosts
and spirits. Bartlett notes that when asked to recall the story, many
subjects left out most or all supernatural occurrences, despite the
salience of these events to the narrative. These elements were
replaced with more familiar cultural symbols or behaviors that
were not in the original story, such as a dying man’s face turning
white. Alba and Hasher (1983) describe this as a schematic process
in which the memory is selected, abstracted, interpreted and inte-
grated. They describe these four forms of construction in memory
thus:
selection – a process that chooses only some of all incoming stimuli
for representation; abstraction – a process that stores the meaning of a
message without reference to the original syntactic and lexical content;
interpretation – a process by which relevant prior knowledge is gen-
erated to aid comprehension; and integration – a process by which a
single, holistic memory representation is formed from the products of
the previous three operations (p. 203).
Therefore, rationalization of unusual elements occurs in wak-
ing narratives. If dream narratives involve many bizarre elements,
rationalization can occur, although since we cannot compare the
report with the original dream experience, it is unclear to what
extent.
This analogy between the war of the ghosts and dreaming is
not perfect, since months passed between the reading of the story
and the report, whereas dreams are usually reported directly after
waking. However, as I discuss in the following section, memory
loss for dreaming is generally far more rapid and dreams are more
bizarre than waking memories, so the reconstruction process may
also occur more rapidly, perhaps immediately upon waking or
during the reporting of the dream. Poormemory during sleepmay
exacerbate confabulation, as it does in patients with confabulation
disorders.
CONFABULATION AND MEMORY LOSS
Memory loss is an important complicating factor regarding dream
report collection. Upon waking, memory of dreams is highly
reduced and such memory deﬁcits can lead to confabulation of
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reports. Many sleep experiences fade completely upon waking.
Frequently, one is left with very poor or no recollection. For most
dreams to be remembered, mental effort is required. Upon wak-
ing, we attempt to retain residual impressions of the experience,
and during that process we assemble impressions into a coher-
ent narrative. Training and practicing remembering dreams and
making dream reports may improve reporting accuracy, but it
is not clear to what extent. Schredl et al. (1996) and Schonbar
(1965) note that if subjects are interested in dream reporting, have
a positive attitude towards dreams or are particularly well moti-
vated, dream reporting is often more frequent. However, increased
dream reporting does not entail that these reports are accurate.
For example, in Arkin et al. (1966) attempt to improve dream
recall and cause sleep talk to verify reports by hypnotizing subjects
before sleep, even these reports are often pieced together as the
dreamer attempts to remember the speciﬁcs of the experience. For
example:
Uh-uhm-uh-gee I- something about- yeah- a hat- belonging to you
know- one of those old sheep herder hats- I don’t remember what it
was all about though.
This report was correlated with sleep speech:
Mm- mmm- how about this hat (?) from India where- where it was
made by camel driver- damn thing [pause] pretty little bugger. (The (?)
indicates a word which was unclear) (Arkin et al., 1966, p. 205).
This report was made directly after an REM sleep awakening,
nonetheless the details are very vague, and much of the dream
forgotten. The sleep talk differs from the report, which does not
mention a camel driver, India, or that the hat was pretty. There is
inconsistency between the sleep talk referring to a shepherd, and
the report about a camel driver. It is unclear whether the sleep
talk is about a hat at all, since the researchers assumed that an
unintelligible word was “hat.” This demonstrates that even direct
REM sleep awakening reports are subject to rapid memory loss.
Although waking directly from a dream most likely increases the
accuracy of the report since there is less time to confabulate, an
accurate report is not guaranteed.
Reporting and rehearsing a memory can affect what is remem-
bered. Rehearsing causes certain salient parts of the event to be
remembered in detail whilst other parts of the event are forgotten.
In a study of 56 participants by Horton (2011), the test group
rehearsed their dream reports, and the control group did not
rehearse. It was found that rehearsal did not increase the richness
of detail of memory, but rather caused the dream to be remem-
bered in precisely the same way as it was initially reported. The
group that did not rehearse the dream reported different elements
of the dream at different times. This suggests that when a report is
rehearsed, the report is remembered as opposed to the dream itself.
Horton concludes that“the effect of rehearsal can limitwhat is later
recalled, as well as enhance it. What is recalled is the report, rather
than the original dream or event itself” (Horton, 2011, p. 12). It is
unclearwhether rehearsal enhances somememories or rather leads
to fabricated elements being remembered instead of the dream
itself.
All memory is subject to forgetting, however, I argue that
dream memory is distinctively problematic. Memory is not like a
notebook in which information is stored for later retrieval; rather
it is complex and involves multiple events entwining, often with
forgotten items ﬁlled in by unrelated events and confabulation.
Sutton (1998, p. 2) describes memories as being “blended, not
laid down independently once and for all, and [. . .] reconstructed
rather than reproduced.” Memory of an event may be recon-
structed with elements of many separate events. When details
of an event are forgotten, this can lead to “ﬁlling in the blanks”
and blending memories together. For Schechtman (1994), this
blending, summarizing, condensing, and conﬂating of memories
is necessary for our sense of self. She argues that “it is precisely
insofar as our memories smooth over the boundaries between the
different moments of our lives, interpreting and reinterpreting
individual experiences in the context of the whole, that we are
able to produce a coherent life history” (p. 13). This describes
what many would refer to as the failings of memory as opposed
to essential processes that enables us to see our memories as part
of an integrated whole. Sutton (2003) notes that reconstruction
does not necessarily render memories false, but rather reconstruc-
tion is a necessary condition for remembering since all memories
are reconstructed. Remembering isn’t replaying the event in one’s
mind exactly theway it was, but rather interpreting and integrating
memory traces. Reconstructed memory can be veridical but dif-
ferent from the initial experience, for example when the observer
switches perspectives, viewing the event from an angle which they
did not perceive initially (Rice and Rubin, 2009), e.g., a bird’s eye
view, known as a switch from“ﬁeld” to“observer”perspective. The
sequence of events remembered may be accurate despite the origi-
nal perspective not being represented accurately. Reinterpretation,
argues Sutton, is the norm, not the exception. One might argue
from this that reinterpreted dreams aren’t necessarily false mem-
ories, however, dreams are especially problematic for a variety of
reasons.
If a memory can be accurate even if the perspective has been
switch from ﬁeld to observer, it is unclear what to make of the
switching of perspective in dreams15. A dream report in which
the observer is looking down from an observer or birds eye per-
spective is usually interpreted as if the observer in the dream
was in fact looking down from above. In contrast, in a waking
report we can infer that during the event, the observer did not
literally switch perspectives, as that would be physically impos-
sible. So it is not clear what to make of the veracity of such a
report. We do not know whether the dreamer was literally looking
down from above or rather the perspective shift occurred only in
memory.
A further issue is that, even if memories can shift and blend
and still be “accurate,” many memories are not accurate, and we
need to determine the accuracy of dream memories. Dreams fade
much more quickly and are more difﬁcult to retain than memories
of waking events. Most dreams are forgotten instantly, especially
if we do not wake immediately after dreaming. Hobson (2005)
remarks, memory for dreams in subsequent waking is notoriously
poor. [. . .] I am a relatively good dream recaller, and I consistently
record those that I remember. My collection of reports is on the
15For a discussion of shifting perspectives in dreams, see Rosen and Sutton (2013)
forthcoming in Philosophy Compass.
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order of 400 entries in a journal that I have kept for 30 years. That
is just a bit more than 1 a month! [. . .] If I were that amnestic in
waking, I would be in a mental hospital (p. 27).
In contrast, Beaulieu-Prevost and Zadra (2005) argue that
well motivated dream aﬁcionados can report dreams quite reg-
ularly, some report dreams every morning. Nonetheless, even the
most motivated dream reporters forget most dreams. Multiple
sessions of REM sleep occur every night and dreaming occurs
in most of these sessions and 80–90% of REM sleep awaken-
ings lead to reports (Domhoff, 2003, p. 17), but individuals
rarely report more than one dream upon waking in the morn-
ing. Therefore even regular reporters forgetmost dreams. Reduced
memory capacity can lead to greater confabulation when attempt-
ing to recall events, so we should expect less accuracy in dream
reports.
Another difference betweendreamandwakingmemory reports
is that other observers can verify waking memories. Waking mem-
ory can be easily discredited when stories conﬂict with external
evidence. In contrast, the dream environment is internally gen-
erated, so as Malcolm argues, the dream content cannot be
externally veriﬁed. We cannot use cues from the external envi-
ronment to assist with memory of dreams, and dream memories
cannot be evaluated for plausibility since dreams can be bizarre
and fantastical. In the following section I will discuss a ﬁnal
problem afﬂicting dream reporting, which is that some dreams
involve altered states of consciousness that cannot be reported
accurately.
ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN DREAMS AND THEIR
COMPREHENSIBILITY
One possible explanation for unreliability of dream reporting is
the change in brain function that occurs while dreaming. Dur-
ing REM sleep, the brain generally exhibits increased activation
in sensorimotor areas, visual areas and emotional centers, whilst
there is decreased activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) and memory storage and access areas (Hobson et al.,
2000). With an altered neuromodulatory system and changes
in activation in the brain, we may lack some abilities associ-
ated with normal functioning consciousness16. The experience
that occurs in this altered state of consciousness might be difﬁ-
cult for the waking mind to comprehend. Signiﬁcant alteration
in mental state may mean that the experiences occurring in that
state are incomprehensible to the normal waking mind, just as a
bizarre hallucination might be difﬁcult to comprehend, remember
and describe. If a dream experience is sufﬁciently different from
waking experience, the waking mind might need to confabulate
to make the experience reportable. Perhaps a fully functioning
waking mind cannot comprehend the altered state. The waking
mind may try to rationalize the experience so it can be reported
in a meaningful way, a process that goes far deeper than a few
rationalized bizarre elements; rather the entire narrative is a
fabrication.
16Not all dreams involve these neural and cognitive differences. For example Dresler
et al. (2012) found lucid dreams involve higher cognitive capacities and has demon-
strated increased neural activations in frontal and frontolateral regions of the brain.
Also, lucid dreams demonstrate high levels of cognitive ability.
Some evidence suggests that there is a carry-over state after
waking in which certain attributes of the brain in REM sleep
persist. Most have experienced this state directly after waking; con-
fusion, disorientation and failure to realize theywere just dreaming
(Balkin et al., 1999; Reinsel and Antrobus, 1992). Some argue that
dreams that are reported directly after waking from REM sleep can
be highly accurate since the carry-over effect allows for the mind
to remain in an altered state. This may also explain why fewer
reports are elicited in the morning compared with REM awaken-
ings. However, it is unclear whether this waking stage retains the
altered state of REM sleep, or whether it is an in-between state.
A carryover state would not necessarily elicit clear and coherent
dream reports, since an individual who has just woken and is con-
fused and disoriented would most likely report inaccurately. This
is strongly suggested by the Arkin et al. (1966) example discussed
in Section “Confabulation and Memory Loss.” The participant
mumbles in a barely coherent way and the narrative remains quite
unclear.
The issue of confabulation of dream reports is complicated by
the possibilities that certain types of experience are more likely to
be confabulated than others, and that certain individuals are more
susceptible to fabrication. I argue that it is difﬁcult to determine
whether fabrication occurs and to what extent.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN DREAM REPORT
FABRICATION
In this section I argue that certain individuals are more prone to
confabulation than others, but dreams are more prone to con-
fabulation in general than waking reports. Research indicating
individual difference in dream recall (Schonbar, 1965; Schredl
et al., 1996), a relation between dream recall and interest in dreams
(Beaulieu-Prevost and Zadra, 2005) and relationships between
dream recall and gender (Schredl, 2002–2003) suggest that there
are many differences between individuals regarding the number of
dreams that are recalled and reported in the morning. This might
suggest there are also individual differences regarding the accu-
racy of dream reports. However, this claim is much harder to test,
as report frequency can be determined simply by keeping track
of the number of reports. Determining report accuracy requires
comparison between report and dream, which is not currently
possible.
Garry et al. (1996) demonstrate that if someone imagines an
event, they are more likely to later believe that it occurred than
events they had not imagined. They coined the term imagina-
tion inﬂation to refer to the tendency in adult subjects to judge
childhood events that they had imagined as more likely to have
occurred than events they did not imagine. Imagination inﬂa-
tion also occurs when subjects imagine future events, and judge
whether the event is likely to occur (Carroll, 1978; Gregory et al.,
1982). This is consistent with the theory that remembering is
goal driven as opposed to solely accuracy driven (Conway, 2005;
Sutton et al., 2010). According to this view, memory involves
principles of both correspondence: accurate representation of real
events, and coherence: the maintenance of narrative coherence
of events over time that make sense to the individual. There are
multiple functions of memory, of which accurate portrayal of
past events is only one (Boyer and Wertsch, 2009). Imagination
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might similarly affect dreams; if someone imagines dreaming the
event, they are more likely to later believe they have dreamt it.
Although it has not been tested, dreams may be even more prone
to imagination inﬂation since dream events are often difﬁcult to
distinguish from imagined events. Here I argue that dreaming is
subject to a higher degree of imagination inﬂation due to poor
memory, bizarreness of dreams, and because we are unable to
assess the likelihood that a dream even occurred by judging its
plausibility.
Heaps and Nash (1999) discovered that there are individual dif-
ferences in imagination inﬂation. They explain thatwhile hypnosis
is sometimes used for recovering lost memories, certain individ-
uals are prone to report false memories under hypnosis due to
suggestions from the hypnotizer. A famous example is the case of
Paul Ingram, a man who began to report bizarre false memories
about incest and Satanist cults after hypnotic suggestion (Ofshe,
1992). This gives further reason to be wary of aforementioned
experiments of Arkin et al. (1966, 1970a,b), which involved hyp-
notism. Heaps and Nash used the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale
(GSS; Gudjonsson, 1984) to identify interrogative suggestibility
(susceptibility to the inﬂuence of an authoritative questioning
source) and hypnotic suggestibility (susceptibility to inﬂuence
under hypnosis) in test subjects. They found that individuals who
are prone to hypnotic suggestion are also more prone to imag-
ination inﬂation, i.e., to mistake imagination for memory. This
is linked with dissociativity, deﬁned as failure to “distinguish and
integrate memories, fantasies, motivations, and actions in aware-
ness (Spiegel, 1995, Whalen and Nash, 1996)” (Heaps and Nash,
1999, p. 314). Dissociative individuals experience disrupted mem-
ory, confuse real events with fantasy and are more likely to mistake
imagination for memory.
Heaps and Nash (1999) interviewed subjects on how likely it
was that they had experienced certain events before the age of
10, such as whether they had broken a window with their hand.
2 weeks later they were asked to perform the same interview again
under the pretence that the initial responses had been lost. They
found that people who are dissociative or prone to hypnotic sug-
gestion were more likely to report in the second interview that
they had broken a window with their hand despite initially deny-
ing remembering the experience. Heaps and Nash suggest that
because dissociative individuals are unable to distinguish and inte-
grate memories and fantasies, they rely less on their memories
and more on inferences and external evidence. Normal, waking
individuals also demonstrate such reliance, but to a lesser extent.
French and Richards (1993) found that when asked to draw a
Roman numeral clock, almost all participants drew the 4 in the
clock as “IV” despite the fact that Roman numeral clocks repre-
sent the 4 as “IIII.” They explain that individuals rely on their
schematic knowledge of the way numerals are represented rather
than their memory of the clock. This commonly occurs in cases
where normal participants cannot rely on their memories. How-
ever, dissociative patients, who suffer from frequent disruptions
of episodic memory are forced to rely more heavily on schematic
knowledge, and have lower standards for accepting memories as
real (Heaps and Nash, 1999, p. 317).
Individuals who are prone to hypnotic suggestion or dis-
sociation and who ﬁnd it harder to distinguish between
autobiographical memories of experienced events and seman-
tic memories or imagination may be less able to distinguish
between dreams and other memories. For example, they may
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to distinguish between fantasizing before falling
asleep and the content of their dreams. Screening research sam-
ples for those who are more likely to confabulate might be
necessary for accurate dream research, although a separate exper-
iment may be required to ascertain whether the same individuals
are more prone to confabulate dream reports. I propose that
a similar experiment to Heaps and Nash’s (1999) could deter-
mine the extent of imagination inﬂation differences in dream-
ing. Firstly, participants would be asked to imagine a speciﬁc
event before falling asleep, and then researchers would com-
pare whether a dream report the following morning or during
an REM awakening involved the imagined elements. Differ-
ences between dissociative and normal participants could then
be ascertained17. I predict that dreaming is highly suscepti-
ble to imagination inﬂation in all individuals: in many dreams
it is difﬁcult to distinguish and integrate memories, fantasies,
motivations and actions in awareness due to decreased mem-
ory and other cognitive capacities. If this prediction is correct,
there would be less difference between dissociative patients and
normal controls regarding the amount of imagined events incor-
porated into the dream report than we see in waking memory
reports.
Heaps and Nash’s (1999) description of “dissociativity” as dis-
ruptions in episodic memory leading to difﬁculties distinguishing
between real and imagined events is an accurate description of
many dream states. Barrett (1995) argues that many of the cogni-
tive features of dreaming are similar to those of dissociative states.
This is supported by experiments carried out by Johnson et al.
(1984) who found that subjects generally have difﬁculty discrim-
inating between their own dreams and reports of others’ dreams.
They argue that this is not simply an issue of poormemory, but that
dreams are “deﬁcient in conscious cognitive operations that help
identify the origin of information generated in a waking state”
(p. 329). Since dreams are generated unconsciously, they often
lack important cues that assist in distinguishing imagined from
experienced events.
Another reason to suspect that dreams are often hard to dis-
tinguish from other mental states is that we cannot “reality-test”
to distinguish between imagination and dream memories. Wak-
ing memory can be judged as plausible if it is consistent with
other waking events. This is not so for dream memories, since
dreams need not be plausible by waking standards. Since neither
dreams nor imaginings need to be plausible events, we can-
not reality-test to distinguish whether I dreamed or imagined
something.
17Sincewe cannot determinewhether imagination is later incorporated into a dream
(and hence a report of the imagination as a dream would be accurate) we cannot
ascertain the accuracy of the report in the samewaywe could determine the accuracy
of the waking report. However, if dissociative individuals report dreaming what they
previously were imagining more often than non-dissociative individuals, the two
possible explanations are that (1). Imagination inﬂation is occurring more often in
dissociative individuals or (2). dissociative individuals are more likely to incorporate
imagination into a dream. Given previous research on dissociative individuals, we
would have more reason to support explanation 1.
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I have highlighted some reasons why dream reports are more
prone to fabrication than waking memories, and proposed an
experiment to test whether dream reports are prone to imag-
ination inﬂation. In the following section I will discuss what
evidence could verify or disprove the narrative fabrication the-
sis, or rather how we could discern to what extent fabrication
occurs.
VERIFYING FABRICATION
Dreamers report a range of experiences anywhere from highly
bizarre and incoherent to realistic simulations of waking events.
I have suggested that highly incoherent dreams are less likely to
be reported accurately, since bizarre elements get rationalized,
but does this mean that bizarre dream reports involve a weaker
degree of fabrication? How can we report bizarre dreams at all?18
To the former I would respond that bizarre reports are not nec-
essarily indications of lesser fabrication, since the initial dream
experience may have been even more bizarre. It is unclear what
extent rationalization occurs. In the case in the war of the ghosts,
not all participants left out the supernatural elements, so individ-
ual differences in narrative rationalization may occur in dream
reports as well. We still report bizarre dreams (as opposed to only
reporting normal, waking life-like dreams) because rationaliza-
tion is not consistent across reports, and levels of bizarreness most
likely alter in dreams. We sometimes report bizarre waking expe-
riences and bizarre, supernatural stories, however, sometimes we
rationalize away the bizarre elements. My contention is that it
is unclear how much the narrative has been altered by the time
the dream is reported. As with the war of the ghosts experiment,
bizarre narratives are often rationalized into more coherent nar-
ratives but not always or to the same extent. Unlike the war of
the ghosts experiment, the report cannot be compared with the
original experience and conﬁrmed. The mind may not be able
to rationalize away all bizarre features into a completely coher-
ent narrative, which is why bizarre dreams are still reported.
Some may argue that current experiments on lucid dreaming and
REM sleep behavior disorder provide veriﬁcation for dream con-
tent, however, I disagree. I will argue that better methods are
required to determine to what extent dreams are fabricated. I
will then suggest some methods that could be carried out in the
future.
Lucid dreaming tasks in which a lucid dreamer performs activ-
ities such as drawing letters, and signaling when the activity is
complete may be a method of increasing the accuracy and pro-
viding some veriﬁcation of dream content as well as providing
strong evidence that the dreamer is conscious and aware they
are dreaming. However, such an experiment would not fail-
safe against all report fabrication. It may conﬁrm the dreamer
is performing a speciﬁc activity, yet it would not verify other
dream elements. For example, a strange setting may still be ratio-
nalized away or forgotten in the report because of its unusual
nature. Thus, even lucid dream reports under strict conditions
may involve confabulation. A second issue is that lucid dreams
are not representative of all dreams. Researchers who focus
on non-lucid dreams cannot assume that they are similar to
18Thanks to Thomas Metzinger for these points.
lucid dreams in all relevant aspects. I suspect that lucid dream
reports are in general more accurate than non-lucid dream reports
due to increased memory and rational capacities. Later in this
section I will propose a method to test this. However, lucid
dreams cannot replace non-lucid dreams in research for the pur-
pose of minimizing report confabulation because they are not
representative.
Rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder as discussed in
Section “Sleep as Deﬁned by Neuropsychology and Lucid Dream-
ing Conﬁrm that Experience Occurs During Sleep” provides
another example in which dreams can be corroborated with sleep
behavior. However, it is important to note that RBD is caused by
neurological disorders which can also affect the content of dreams
(Schenck et al., 1987). For example, RBD sufferers experience a
higher frequency of violence in dreams, so should not be seen as
indicative of all dreaming. Secondly, although RBD gives some
evidence that experience is occurring during sleep, such behavior
only provides vague evidence of general dream content. Schenck
et al. (1987) note a case in which a sleeping man who was throwing
punches woke up to report that hewas having a dreamof ﬁghting a
squirrel in the attic. Mahowald et al. (2005) report a case of a man
who killed his girlfriendwhile dreaming of fending off an intruder.
Although violent behavior can be correlated with reports of vio-
lent dreams, the behavior does not inform an outside observer of
the speciﬁcs of the dream content. We cannot judge from behavior
alone that the ﬁrst man was attacking squirrels in his dream, or
that the second was fending off an intruder. Also, it is unclear if the
reported dream correlated with that particular session of behavior,
or if it was a previous dream. Perhaps the reported dream and the
behavior were not from the same session. So RBD behavior does
not verify dream content, and does not safeguard against narrative
fabrication.
Some theorists may ﬁnd such skepticism unsatisfying, as our
current methods do not verify speciﬁc dream content or and can-
not conﬁrm or deny predictions regarding the extent to which
fabrication occurs. However, with improved technology and
improved methods, this may not always be the case. As aforemen-
tioned, we cannot currently verify cognition from neuroimaging,
however, progress in our understanding of the brain and advanced
technology may one day make this possible. Coltheart (2006)
argues that neuroimaging is uninformative becausewewould need
a full explanation of brain function for brain images to be useful,
but once our understanding is complete we would no longer need
images of the brain to understand the brain. However, it is not
quite true that such technology would be uninformative for other
purposes. We could use real-time function brain activity images to
discern the cognitive state of or receive communication from an
individual that was otherwise unable to communicate, for exam-
ple, patients in comas, locked in syndrome, or dreaming subjects.
So although I agree with Coltheart’s assessment that with current
technology we cannot discern cognitive states from brain imaging
alone, in the future this may be possible. With this technology we
could ascertain accurate information about dream content. It is
possible that in the future, neuroimaging or other technologies
will be about to discern even what a person is dreaming while they
sleep. Perhaps outside observers could experience someone else’s
dream. One intriguing although somewhat unnerving possibility
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would be to could recreate a “ﬁlm” of someone’s dream while it
happens based on their neural activation. This information could
then be compared with dream reports to ascertain to what extent
we fabricate reports. However, this is a far off possibility, and I
would like to propose an alternative that would be achievable with
current technology.
An exciting possibility that does not require futuristic technol-
ogy would be to extend research into sleep signaling in an attempt
to have subject signal speciﬁc content of the dream with eye move-
ments. Eye signaling experiments discussed above demonstrate
that this is possible, however, these experiments not intended to
verify dream content, but rather to demonstrate whether bodily
movements correlate with dream content. With a greater focus
on verifying dream content, this could be achieved. Schatzman
et al. (1988) have demonstrated that a lucid dreamer eye signals
do in fact correlate with dreaming eye movements, and dreamers
can signal that they are dreaming. However, one of Schatzman’s
experiments also provides evidence that it is possible to commu-
nicate more speciﬁc content of the lucid dream as well. Worsley,
an expert lucid dreamer, carried out instructions to draw large
numbers on the ground after lucidity onset. He ﬁrst indicated
lucidity by performing a set of prearranged eye movements. Then
he drew the numbers while tracking his arm movements with his
eyes. He signaled the completion of each number with eye ﬂicks
corresponding to the number drawn (one ﬂick for number 1, two
ﬂicks for number 2 etc). All of these eye movements were recorded
by EOG. The electromyography (EMG) strapped to his forearm
picked up the tensing of his muscles which correlated with the
writing movement. This raises the possibility of directly reporting
dreams whilst dreaming. Although the eye ﬂicks only reported the
numbers that were being drawn by the dreamer, this can be seen as
a direct communicationof someof the content of the dream. How-
ever, since the aim of the experiment was to determine whether
bodily movements correlate with dream body movements, further
effort was not made to directly communicate other more speciﬁc
dream content.
LaBerge (1994) notes that attempts were made to teach lucid
dreamers to use sign language to convey dream content whilst
asleep. This research paradigm used a sensor glove to attempt to
record the movements. At the time of publication, existing tech-
nology was not sensitive enough to read the hand signals and to
my knowledge, there have been no recent successful attempts to
achieve this. Perhaps reduced muscle tone during sleep would
make it unlikely for hand signals to be sufﬁciently strong for
recording19. So it is unlikely that hand-sign language could be
used to communicate dream content. However, as previously
mentioned, eye movements have proven to be successful thus far
in indicating a few elements of dream content. I propose that a
type of eye movement sign language could be adopted to verify
more detailed dream content, and communicate directly while
dreaming. An example of eye movement communication can be
seen in the case of patients with locked in syndrome, a disor-
der in which patients are completely paralyzed except for their
19In their most recent paper, Kahan and LaBerge (2011) overview the strong evi-
dence in support of lucid dreaming, including eye signaling, but make no mention
of any progress using the hand signaling method.
eyes (Chapman, 1991). The primary method of communication
for people with locked in and other similar disabilities is “eye
typing” (Majaranta and Raiha, 2002). This method uses a vir-
tual keyboard and eye tracker so that the individual can type
words by directing their gaze at the desired letter on a keypad.
This method of course could not be used for dreaming patients
due to the input blockade as the dreamer could not look at a
keypad whilst asleep. However, an alternative method of eye
movement sign language could be devised. The method that
springs to mind is Morse code. A signaling system using left and
right eye ﬂicks instead of long and short taps could be learnt by
expert lucid dreamers and used to communicate dream content.
For example, the word “dream,” which in Morse code is [-/-//-
/- -] (where is a short tap, - is long, and / refers to a pause)
would be indicated with left and right eye ﬂicks as following:
[RLL/LRL/L/LR/RR]. Methods of EOG signal processing can be
used to detect eye movement directions, as shown by Merino et al.
(2010). Yet the difﬁculty and complexity of such an experiment is
obvious.
Firstly, learning such a complex sign language would be difﬁ-
cult and being able to replicate it during a dream would require
participants to be both dream-code and lucid-control dreaming
experts. Maintaining sufﬁcient concentration during even a lucid
dream is difﬁcult. Secondly, the time it takes to signal even the
word “dream” is signiﬁcant, so there would be a limit on how
much detail that could be reported. Majaranta and Raiha (2002)
notes that practiced users of the eye-controlled virtual keyboard
typing system can type about six words per minute. A quicker
signal method could incorporate left, right, up, and down eye
movements, so that the 20 most common letters would require
only one or two eye ﬂicks. This would speed up the process.
Another problem is that there may be a disruption of the con-
tent of the dream when the subject intentionally disrupts their
eye-movements. Tholey (1983) found that when lucid dreamers
focus their eyes on a stationary object, it often causes them to
wake up. It is unclear, however, whether controlled eye ﬂicks
would cause the same phenomenon. Signaling with eye ﬂicks
has been a method use both by LaBerge and colleagues, Schatz-
man and colleagues and other research groups as previously
mentioned. They have not reported that eye ﬂicking leads to
shorter periods of dreaming, premature awakening or disrupted
content.
The main drawback of this technique is that it can only be
applied to lucid dreams. A dreaming participant would not be
able to signal if they did not know they were dreaming. This
is problematic because, as argued earlier, lucid dreaming is not
representative of all types of dreaming. The increased metacog-
nitive and other cognitive abilities including control, memory,
and rational capacity mean that lucid dreams are probably less
prone to confabulation than the non-lucid variety. So correlat-
ing dream reports with eye signaling reports would not verify
the accuracy of dream reports in general. Such signaling reports
would give strong evidence for the accuracy of lucid dream
reports (if my prediction that lucid dream reports are more accu-
rate than non-lucid reports is correct), but this could neither
conﬁrm nor deny the narrative fabrication thesis for non-lucid
dreams.
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The aforementioned future technologies and experimental
methods would not only give us direct access to dream content,
they would go some way towards demonstrating the extent to
which report fabrication occurs between dreaming and the initial
REM awakening report. Individual differences in report fabrica-
tion could also be researched. So although the narrative fabrication
thesis is currently difﬁcult to verify, this may be possible in the
future.
CONCLUSION
Malcolm’s veriﬁcationist criteria for dreaming are in many ways
implausible given the current scientiﬁc evidence. I have argued
that Malcolm’s and Dennett’s anti-experience views should be
rejected. There is strong evidence that experiences occur during
sleep. However, I have argued against the assumption that dream
reports are generally accurate. Dream reports are not as reliable
evidence for dream experience as waking reports are for waking
experience. It is implausible to deny outright that experiences
do occur during sleep but dream reports are often confabulated
because of poor memory, confusion of bizarre dream content
and changes in cognition. In these cases, dreams are difﬁcult to
remember and report, so confabulation and inference-making
occurs.
It is well documented that narratives can be confabulated
between initial REM sleep awakenings and subsequent reports.
I argue that we have reason to suspect that fabrication occurs in
the original report as well. Evidence for this is the tendency to
rationalize strange elements in waking reports. Subjects tend to
leave out supernatural or bizarre elements when reporting wak-
ing memories of stories, as exempliﬁed in Bartlett’s war of the
ghosts. Confabulation is exacerbated in dreams by rapid mem-
ory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is a process
of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking
memory, we cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream expe-
riences involve imaginative elements, and dream content cannot
be veriﬁed with external evidence. In summary, dream reports
suffer from diminished memory, bizarre content, source confu-
sion, and cannot be veriﬁed with external evidence. I have argued
that although lucid dreaming provides veriﬁcation of conscious
experience during sleep, we cannot verify the speciﬁc content
of dreams, nor rule out with certainty that a report has been
fabricated.
I have proposed three methods to test my views. Firstly, I pro-
posed a comparison between dissociative and non-dissociative
individuals in imagination inﬂation of dream reporting. My
theory predicts that there should be less difference between disso-
ciative and non-dissociative individuals in dream reporting than
in waking memory reporting because dreams themselves are dis-
sociative. Secondly, I noted that in the future, new neuroimaging
technology and methods might be used to get direct informa-
tion about the content of dreams, and this would either verify
or disprove my theory by comparing the direct content with the
dream report. Finally, I proposed a new method of dream signal-
ing. Instead of using hand-sign language as LaBerge attempted, we
should incorporate eye-ﬂick sign language. This method is limited
in that it would only verify the content of lucid dreams, not non-
lucid dreams, and I expect that lucid dreams would elicit more
accurate reports than non-lucid dreams.
I do not argue that all dream reports are inaccurate or that
all dreams are cognitively impoverished. Reports of dreams that
involve higher cognitive functions, logical inferences and rational-
ity are more likely to be reliable than cognitively deﬁcient dreams.
However, I have raised two main issues. Firstly, dream reports are
generally much less accurate than waking reports, and secondly,
we cannot use current scientiﬁc methods conﬁrm the extent to
which dream reports are confabulated. With the new methods
that I have proposed and improved future technology, we may one
day be able to discern the accuracy of dream reports and ensure
accurate representation of dream content with external observer
veriﬁcation.
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